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This paper pursues two objectives, one theoretical the other empirical. First, by keeping 
separate two grand strands in the EU studies literature, one on the design and reform of EU 
institutions and the other on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, EU scholars are foreclosing the 
opportunity to address a hitherto unanswered question: When and under what conditions does 
the ‘democratic deficit’ – as it is perceived by political elites in the member states – carry 
institutional design implications? Does the ‘democratic deficit’ really matter to political 
elites, and if this is the case, how does it matter? Will it inform political elites’ preferences 
and choices for institutional design and change? By conceptualising the ‘democratic deficit’ 
as a value of the independent variable, we are guided to ask when and under what conditions 
it informs decisions for institutional design and reform. This paper will develop a set of 
propositions linking political elites’ perceptions about a ‘democratic deficit’ and their 
institutional design preferences. Secondly, to test the plausibility of these propositions, they 
will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The paper shows that the creation and empowerment 
of the European Parliament can be accounted for by applying the propositions elaborated in 
this paper. Hence, a question that has puzzled students of European integration since the 
inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – why national governments 
have successively bestowed the European Parliament (EP) with powers (supervisory, 
budgetary, and legislative) – can only be answered by exploring the conditions under which 
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1. Introduction
∗ 
This paper pursues two objectives, one theoretical the other empirical. First, by keeping 
separate two grand strands in the EU studies literature, one on the design and reform of EU 
institutions and the other on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, EU scholars are foreclosing the 
opportunity to address a hitherto unanswered question: When and under what conditions does 
the ‘democratic deficit’ – as it is perceived by political elites in the member states – carry 
institutional design implications? Does the ‘democratic deficit’ really matter to political elites, 
and if this is the case, how does it matter? Will it inform political elites’ preferences and 
choices for institutional design and change? By conceptualising the ‘democratic deficit’ as a 
value of the independent variable, we are guided to ask when and under what conditions it 
informs decisions for institutional design and reform. This paper will develop a set of 
propositions linking political elites’ perceptions about a ‘democratic deficit’ and their 
institutional design preferences. Secondly, to test the plausibility of these propositions, they 
will be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The paper shows that the creation and empowerment 
of the European Parliament can be accounted for by applying the propositions elaborated in 
this paper. Hence, a question that has puzzled students of European integration since the 
inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – why national governments 
have successively bestowed the European Parliament (EP) with powers (supervisory, 
budgetary, and legislative) – can only be answered by exploring the conditions under which 
the ‘democratic deficit’ – as perceived by political elites – will carry institutional design 
implications.
1 To test the theoretical claims advanced in this paper, three landmark-decisions 
which have resulted in the gradual delegation of the power-‘trias’ to the EP will be 
scrutinised: the Treaty of Paris instituting the European ECSC signed in 1951 ‘created’ the 
Common Assembly and endowed it with supervisory powers vis-à-vis the ‘executive’ High 
Authority (functional and institutional equivalent of the Commission); the Treaty of 
Luxembourg signed in 1970 reformed the Community’s budgetary procedure, endowing the 
EP with limited budgetary powers; the Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986 completes 
the ‘trias’ by bestowing the EP with the power to influence legislative outcomes through the 
co-operation procedure and the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1991, further extends the 
legislative powers of the EP. 
 
This paper will be organised as follows. In the next section (2.), it will be shown that extant 
approaches of institutional design and reform have neglected the question of why national 
governments have created and successively empowered the EP. Moreover, I will argue that 
we experience a lack of analytical tools to appreciate the existence and successive 
empowerment of representative, parliamentary institutions (so called majoritarian 
institutions) in international polities. The ensuing section (3.) introduces some theoretical 
considerations in order to overcome this shortcoming in the literature and develops a theory of 
majoritarian institutions in international systems of governance. Sections 4-6 assess the 
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1 Among the few scholarly attempts to explain the empowerment of the European Parliament, Jachtenfuchs 
(1999), Wagner (1999, 2001) and Hix (2002) are the most comprehensive.   3
plausibility of the theory by analysing three sets of cases which traditionally represent a 
parliament’s power ‘trias’ in order to explain why national governments endowed the 
European Parliament with these competencies: supervisory powers (ECSC), budgetary 
powers (Treaty of Luxembourg), legislative powers (SEA and Maastricht). In the final 
sections of this paper, I will provide a brief summary of the key findings (7.) as well as a few 
closing remarks to explain why, as of yet, those scholars most concerned with EU 
‘democracy’ have not provided answers for the questions of why the EU’s majoritarian 
institution, the European Parliament, was created and empowered and of why the institutional 
settings of other international institutions do not contain representative or majoritarian 
elements (8.). 
 
2. The limits of the functional theory of delegation 
A myriad of accounts for institutional design and change rest on the assumption that political 
elites (try to) anticipate the effects or functions of alternative sets of institutions and opt for 
those which best serve their interests (see, for example, Keohane, 1984). This functional 
approach to institutional choice is now a standard one in efforts to explain principals’ 
(Member States’) decisions to pool and delegate
2 sovereignty to agents (non-majoritarian 
institutions)
3 such as the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European 
Central Bank (Moravcsik, 1991, 1998, Garrett, 1992; Pollack, 1997, 1999, 2002, Tallberg, 
2000), and to account for the design of elaborate mechanisms to control these supranational 
agents (Pollack, 1997, 2003; Franchino, 2000). 
 
The above-mentioned accounts of delegation and agency control all share the assumption that 
social action is driven by a ‘logic of consequentialism’
4: Principals calculate the expected 
costs and benefits of delegation and will only delegate powers to agents if the expected 
benefits of delegation exceed the expected costs. More specifically, in international politics 
governments may choose to delegate powers to non-majoritarian institution to solve 
commitment problems, i.e. governments pre-commit to a stream of future policy decisions in 
order to remove these decisions from the unilateral tinkering (‘defection’) of individual 
governments. According to Moravcsik, “by pooling and delegating the right to propose, 
legislate, implement, interpret, and enforce agreements, governments restructure future 
domestic incentives, encouraging future cooperation by raising the costs of nondecision or 
noncompliance.” (Moravcsik, 1998: 73) From this perspective, non-majoritarian institutions 
provide solutions to these collective action problems (non-decision and non-compliance), 
because the principals expect them to enhance the credibility of those promises struck 
between different principals (see Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 4). However. non-
majoritarian institutions help fulfil functions other than enhancing credible commitments. For 
example, non-majoritarian institutions help to overcome informational asymmetries in 
‘technical’ policy areas by offering expertise to produce ‘good’ public policy, or to enhance 
the efficiency of rule-making, i.e. they help reducing the decision-costs of principals by 
“respond[ing] to relatively specific problems and issues that arise, while principals set … the 
more general terms of policy …” (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 4) 
 
                                                 
2 While pooling describes decisions by multiple principals to share decision-making competencies through 
adoption of (super)majoritarian decision-rules, delegation refers the transfer of sovereignty from the domestic 
sphere to the supranational level, e.g. to non-majoritarian institutions.  
3 The key characteristic of ‘majoritarian’ institutions is the democratically elected character of its ‘personnel’, 
e.g. MPs or MEPs. In contrast, the personnel of ‘non majoritarian institutions’ is not directly elected or not 
directly managed by the elected officials and hence enjoy some degree of autonomy over a specialised and 
circumscribed policy area (see Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 2). 
4 The locus classicus for the distinction between different logics of action is March and Olsen (1989, 1998),   4
At the same time that the exploration of the functional theory of delegation continues to 
occupy a significant position in the discussion about institutional design and change of 
Community institutions, it has failed to illuminate the motivations that lie behind national 
governments’ decisions to empower a majoritarian parliamentary institution as part of the 
Community’s institutional setting. For the purpose of this article, the crucial question that the 
functional theory of delegation fails to illuminate is the following: When principals pool and 
delegate powers to supranational agents for the reasons listed above, why would they want to 
create and empower a majoritarian institution which, by definition, displays all the problems 
which induce principals to delegate powers to non-majoritarian institutions, and which could 
therefore play a role in unravelling the expected gains of delegation? 
 
Supporters of the functional theory of delegation readily concede that factors other than those 
mentioned above must be at work when exploring actors’ motivations to create and empower 
a majoritarian institution such as the EP: These factors range from ‘central ideas’ about 
democracy (Bräuninger et al., 2001), concerns about the ‘democratic deficit’ (Pollack, 1999, 
2003; Schulz and König, 2001) to different domestic traditions about legitimating policy-
making in unitarily- or federally-organised polities (Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdis, 1999). Yet, explanations of this kind remain unsatisfactory: they either invoke 
‘ideas’ to mop up unexplained variance of institutional choices, or they offer propositions 
which are not subjected to empirical tests. The central shortcoming of the functional theory of 
delegation is nicely summarised by Alex Wendt who argues that the account offered by this 
theory “proposes that designs for institutional control reflect degrees of uncertainty and 
asymmetries of contribution, yet in debates about how to fix the ‘democratic deficit’ in the 
EU and other international organizations such cost-benefit calculations seem less salient than 
questions of legitimacy and principle. Arguably, this is because decision makers themselves 
see democratic accountability as an intrinsic good.” (Wendt, 2001: 1025) 
 
Where to go from here? A seemingly logical link would be the literature on the ‘democratic 
deficit’. Claims that the Community suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’ have been advanced 
by political elites, the media and academics with increasing intensity in the wake of the 
negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty. The academic literature is mainly concerned 
with the assessment of whether or to what degree Community governance meets certain 
democratic standards, defined a priori. To ‘measure’ or assess these standards of democracy, 
accounts of the ‘democratic deficit’ differently emphasise the input and output dimensions of 
the concept of democratic legitimacy. These two dimensions are crucial since they point at 
different motives for compliance with a polity (see, for example, Weber, 1968; Scharpf, 1970, 
1999; Schmidt, 2000). Input-oriented legitimacy emphasises the condition of ‘government by 
the people’ which stipulates that political choices are complied with and hence considered 
legitimate “if and because they reflect the ‘will of the people’ – that is, if they can be derived 
from the authentic preferences of the members of a community” (Scharpf, 1999: 6), while 
output-oriented legitimacy emphasises the condition of ‘government for the people’ which 
defines that political choices are complied with and hence considered legitimate “if and 
because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question.” 
(Scharpf, 1999: 6). With a view to assess the ‘democratic credentials’ of the EU, Carter and 
Scott (1998) and Hix (1998), for example, emphasise the input-dimension of the ‘democratic 
deficit’ (or ‘non-deficit’) whereas Majone (1996a, 1996b, 2000) advance an output-oriented 
interpretation of the Community’s democratic credentials, and Scharpf (1997, 1999, 2001) 
opts for an ‘integrated’ approach which combines both input and output elements 
 
In whatever way Community ‘democracy’ is measured, the ‘democratic deficit’ (as one 
‘extreme’ value of the ‘democracy’-variable) is typically conceptualised as dependent   5
variable. Yet, this perspective obscures the potential explanatory power of the concept for the 
behaviour of political elites, i.e. it does not allow us to ask and find answers to the question 
whether or not political elites care about the democratic credentials of the Community. This is 
an important observation given that the concerns about the ‘democratic deficit’ seem to be 
omnipresent, while its actual implications on the design and reform of Community institutions 
have been downplayed or ‘under’-studied by the literature inspired by the functional theory of 
delegation. If the ‘democratic deficit’ is a real concern to political elites (and not just ‘cheap 
talk’), why shouldn’t it carry behavioural implications (under conditions that will be more 
closely defined in the next section), i.e. by influencing the way political elites think about and 
act upon questions of institutional design and reform? 
 
3. A theory of delegation to majoritarian institutions 
In this section, I will explore the question why and under what conditions political elites care 
about the effects of international cooperation on the ‘democratic credentials’ of the 
Community institutions, i.e. when will political elites perceive a ‘democratic deficit’ and feel 
compelled to do something about reducing it? 
 
The behavioural implications of the perceived ‘democratic deficit’  
Democratic theorists
5 underwrite the argument that the legitimacy of political order and, 
hence, actor compliance with a given system of governance is founded on alternative motives 
which have been introduced in the previous section: input and output legitimacy. Johnston 
(1999) and Hurd (1999) argue that if political actors in international politics were only 
interested in maintaining systems of international governance as long as they produce certain 
material benefits or reduce the costs of sustaining cooperation (e.g., by lowering transaction 
costs), we should nevertheless observe much less compliance with these systems of 
international order. With the terminology introduced here, we could thus argue that input 
legitimacy (i.e. maintaining political order for an intrinsic valuation of maintaining and 
promoting democratic procedures) is the difference between compliance based on material 
incentives (output legitimacy) and the overall degree of compliance with a system of political 
rule. Compliance C is hence a function of both output legitimacy OL and input legitimacy IL. 
 
F(C) = OL + IL 
 
Figure 1 presents this argument graphically, adding time as dimension. When the output 
legitimacy of a polity decreases over time (for example, when decisions to pool and delegate 
generate increasing opposition by actors who feel disadvantaged by these decisions) by factor 
X, the overall amount of compliance decreases only by factor X-Y where Y is the amount of 
input legitimacy. 
 
                                                 
5 See previous footnote.   6
Why is this distinction between input and output legitimacy so vital for the question at hand? 
With the gradual growth of the Community’s policy-making powers through ongoing pooling 
and delegation, the Community has come to exercise functions that, traditionally, belonged to 
the domain of nation states. Against this background, Robert Dahl has observed that the 
process of European integration presents the European public and its political leaders with a 
“fundamental democratic dilemma” (Dahl, 1994: 23) which picks up the composite 
requirement of guaranteeing legitimate political order (fuelled by output  and  input 
legitimacy). Wherever and whenever democratic polities are subjected to significant external 
socio-economic or security challenges which cannot be met unilaterally, political elites face a 
trade-off between, on the one hand, enhancing the capacity of their polity to deal with these 
challenges effectively by increasing the size of their political unit (i.e. through inter- or 
supranational cooperation) and, on the other hand, citizens’ and their representatives’ ability 
to influence the government through direct or indirect participation (which decreases with unit 
size): 
 
“That larger political systems often possess relatively greater capacity to accomplish 
tasks beyond the capacity of smaller systems leads sometimes to a paradox. In very 
small political systems a citizen may be able to participate extensively in decisions 
that do not matter much but cannot participate much in decisions that really matter a 
great deal; whereas very large systems may be able to cope with problems that 
matter more to a citizen, the opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly 
influence decisions are vastly reduced.” (Dahl, 1994: 28)
6 
 
Schmitter (1996), Fligstein and McNichol (1998), and, more recently, Donahue and Pollack 
(2001) have shown that the ‘centralisation’ of policy-making at the Community level has 
                                                 











Figure 1: Sources of legitimacy and system compliance 
Input 
legitimacy 
Source: adapted from Johnston (1999)   7
increased remarkably since the early days of European integration. This development has 
taken place against the backdrop of the development of increasingly influential and powerful 
supranational institutions, i.e. the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
Yet, the ongoing pooling and delegation of national sovereignty to deal with challenges of 
security or socio-economic interdependencies has left democratic processes, on the domestic 
or European level, not unchallenged. Bernhard Weßels claims that this development 
“naturally raises the democratic question of how the system of institutions exercising this 
power is to be controlled and held accountable.” (Weßels, 1999: 2) Given the far-reaching 
competencies of Community institutions, the democratic legitimacy of the evolving 
Community polity is considered a key concern by national political elites. According to a 
survey conducted in 1996 and asked about their satisfaction with the workings of democracy 
in the Community (as opposed to the domestic level), 50% of the respondents among MPs 
from eleven Community countries were ‘not very satisfied’ (40%) or ‘not satisfied at all’ 
(10%). In contrast, when asked about the workings of democracy in their own countries, only 
20% of the respondents among national MPs were not satisfied (Weßels, 1999: Table 1). In 
1998, the European Commission published the results of a survey conducted in 1996 among 
Community ‘top decision makers’ (elected politicians, such as MPs and the MEPs, senior 
national civil servants, business and labour leaders, etc.) which mirror the perceived (albeit 
cross-nationally variable) desire to reform the Community institutions and make them more 
democratic (European Commission, 1998: 14-15, 31-36, A.14-A.21). 
 
The arguments advanced in the previous paragraphs suggest that the process of European 
integration puts the existing equilibrium between input and output legitimacy into jeopardy, 
both at the national level as well as on the European level: While Community Member States 
are predominantly concerned with the pooling and delegation of sovereignty to enhance the 
Community’s problem-solving capacity governance, citizen participation and popular self-
determination is increasingly put under stress as democratic processes in the Member States 
are challenged by decisions to pool or delegate sovereignty. If delegation, i.e. the transfer of 
sovereignty from the domestic sphere to the supranational level, occurs, concerns about input 
legitimacy are likely to be mirrored by the follow questions: Who are supranational actors 
accountable to? Who will control them? Can delegation be justified solely by referring to the 
material gains from cooperation (economic, security, etc.)? If pooling, i.e. the sharing of 
decision-making competencies through adoption of majoritarian decision-rules, occurs, 
concerns about input legitimacy are likely to reflect problems such as: How does pooling 
affect the channels of democratic participation, e.g. parliamentary prerogatives? Who are 
national governments accountable to when portions of their decision-making powers are 
pooled? The following proposition summarises the relationship between pooling and 




Pooling and delegation of national sovereignty will produce an asymmetry between output 




Even if it will be possible to conjecture from empirical evidence that political elites perceive a 
‘legitimacy deficit’, we do not yet know the content of political elites’ proposals that will be 
advanced for its remedy. Will these proposals to reduce the ‘legitimacy deficit’ uniformly 
stress the importance of the EP? The next section will shed light on this question. 
                                                 
7 The two terms will be used interchangeably.   8
 
Alternative proposals to tackle the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ 
National governments and domestic political parties may offer fundamentally different 
interpretations for the perceived severity of the ‘legitimacy deficit’, and they may equally 
pursue different proposals as to how the it should be reduced. In this context, shared beliefs 
about what constitutes a legitimate governance structure play an important role. According to 
Markus Jachtenfuchs and collaborators, these beliefs are based on “convictions about the 
rightfulness of governance shared by actors in the political system. These convictions are not 
uniform or consensual but may differ widely among different groups or corporate actors, for 
… there are always contending structures of meaning, and hence contending polity-ideas.” 
(Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998: 413) Beliefs which express different ‘convictions about the 
rightfulness of governance’ or ‘standards of appropriate governance’ are called ‘democratic 
ideal types’ (Katz, 2000), ‘polity ideas’, or ‘legitimating beliefs’ (Jachtenfuchs et el., 1998, 
Jachtenfuchs, 1999, Diez, 1999). These ‘legitimating beliefs’ are ‘likely candidates’ to guide 
actors’ preferred institutional choices, by serving as road maps or signposts, as they “express 
a world view that influences behaviour not only directly, by setting standards of 
appropriateness for behaviour, but also indirectly through selective prefabricated links 
between values that individuals or collectivities habitually rely upon to address specific 
problems.” (Katzenstein, 1993: 267; see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993, and Jachtenfuchs, 1999) In this context, the prescriptive value of 
‘legitimating beliefs’ held by different societal groups within each Community Member State 
is important to understand the distinct evaluations and assessments of the challenges pooling 
and delegation pose for understanding institutional reform. Recent scholarship has provided 
students of European integration with extensive material to establish a typology of different 
‘legitimating beliefs’ and their prescriptive thrusts (‘if actor A holds legitimating belief X, she 
is likely to propose Z’). Jachtenfuchs and collaborators have developed a typology of different 
‘legitimating beliefs’, based on qualitative content analysis of party manifestoes (see 
Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998; Jachtenfuchs, 1999; Diez, 1999). These ‘legitimating beliefs’, for 
example, guide the actors ‘carrying’ these beliefs in their evaluation of the question of the 
Community’s democratic credentials. Jachtenfuchs and collaborators present four analytically 
distinct ‘polity ideas’, Federal State, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Economic Community 
and Network Governance
8 which allow us to derive propositions with regard to the responses 
political elites are likely to make when they confront a perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’. 
Conditional upon which ‘legitimating belief’ different political elites hold, alternative 
solutions as to how the ‘democratic deficit’ shall be solved will be advanced. 
 
For those adhering to a Federal State ‘legitimating belief’, legitimacy is traditionally the 
expression of a condition of dual popular sovereignty which is split and shared across 
different levels of governance (state- and union-level). The Federal State ‘legitimating belief’ 
therefore combines communitarian and individualistic elements of democratic legitimacy and 
is ‘implemented’ through a system that combines popular representation and state 
representation at the federal- or union-level (Bundesrat or US Congress system). In contrast, 
the  Intergovernmental Cooperation ‘legitimating belief’ is based on the communitarian 
principle or ‘social legitimacy’ which vests legitimate rule in the nation.
9 Inter-state 
cooperation and integration is desirable as long as it is autonomieschonend (i.e. protective of a 
                                                 
8 See Jachtenfuchs (1999: 129-137). The discussion in this article will be limited to the first three ‘legitimating 
beliefs’ (excluding the Network ‘legitimating belief’) because, thus far, they have provided the most prominent 
signposts for political actors’ preferences towards institutional design and reform (see Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998, 
1999). 
9 For a distinction between communitarian and individualistic conceptions of legitimacy in systems of 
international governance, see Schimmelfennig (1996) and Bienen et al. (1998).   9
national democracy’s autonomy) and does not undermine national democratic process and 
institutions. The ‘legitimating belief’ of an Economic Community bases the legitimacy of a 
supranational polity on effective and efficient solutions to allocative problems that can best be 
solved either via the market mechanism or through delegation to non-majoritarian institutions 
such as independent regulatory agencies. To better grasp he distinctiveness of the different 
‘legitimating beliefs’ and the different solutions for the dealing with the ‘legitimacy deficit’, a 
comparison across the following dimensions is helpful (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Legitimating beliefs and ‘readings’ of democracy, legitimate governance and the 
nature of the Community’s ‘legitimacy deficit’ 
 
  Federal State  Intergovernmental 
Cooperation 
Economic Community 
Source of legitimacy  Popular sovereignty at 










democracy at the inter-/ 
supranational level 
Parliamentary assemblies 









Nature of the ‘legitimacy 




gap weakening national 
parliaments, representative 
element at Community-
level is too weak / 




gap weakening national 
parliaments / ‘legitimacy 
deficit’ has to be solved 
domestically (e.g. 
increasing scrutiny powers 
for national parliaments) 
 
Economic effectiveness 
(substance) and efficiency 
(means) guarantee 
legitimacy / indifferent to 
EP empowerment as long 









Alternative proposals to create and reform institutions with a view to reducing the asymmetry 
between  input and output legitimacy (i.e. the ‘legitimacy deficit’) are likely to reflect 
differences in ‘legitimating beliefs’ held by different political elites. 
 
 
Cases and methods 
With regard to the research design and methodology of this paper, two caveats are at order. 
First, the theory advanced in the previous sections offers an account, on the one hand, of why 
and when national governments opt for reducing the democratic ‘legitimacy deficit’, and, on 
the other, the proposals they are likely to advance in order to reduce the asymmetry between 
output and input legitimacy. What this paper, however, does not offer is a comprehensive 
explanation of the bargaining outcome once actors’ preferences have been established.
10 
                                                 
10 Given space constraints, an account of the micro-processes which connect domestic preferences for/against the 
EP’s empowerment with government representatives’ behaviour at IGCs and an analysis of the bargaining 
outcome cannot be provided here.   10
Secondly, the theory constructed in the previous section is a candidate-theory as it was built 
as a result of my research on the creation and empowerment of the EP. Therefore, one stage of 
inquiry before theories can be tested involves exploring the plausibility of such candidate-
theories (Eckstein, 1975: 108). Hence given that there is no prior information on the theory’s 
performance, it seems reasonable to use the three cases presented in this paper as ‘pilot 
studies’ to see whether these plausibility probes confirm the theory’s plausibility and hence 
allow for more extensive data gathering, theory refinement and, ultimately, theory testing 
(see, for example, Bennett and George, 1997 and Odell, 2000) To conduct such ‘pilot studies’, 
it is advisable to choose cases that can be considered ‘easy’ cases for the candidate-theory. I 
have therefore selected cases which should be ‘easy’ for the theory, i.e. cases where pooling 
and/or delegation occurred and where it can thus be expected that concerns about the 
‘legitimacy deficit’ are pertinent.
11 
 
A historical work of this kind requires the analysis of a vast array of both primary and 
secondary sources. Where available, I sought to employ “hard” primary sources. These bear 
the advantage of a high degree of reliability.
12 “Hard” primary sources include, for example, 
internal government reports, reports of confidential deliberations among important decision-
makers, verbatim diary entries, memoirs by crucial participants who have little incentive to 
misrepresent history (see Moravcsik, 1998: 82). In the empirical chapters, I have made 
extensive use of “hard” primary sources, collected from the Historical Archives of the 
European Communities in Florence, in particular with regard to the first two empirical 
chapters, i.e. the creation of the Common Assembly of the ECSC (section 4) and the 
assignment of budgetary powers to the European Parliament with the Treaty of Luxembourg 
in 1970 (section 5). Concerning the more recent cases, i.e. the SEA, Maastricht and the 
delegation of legislative powers to the European Parliament (section 6), archives remain 
inaccessible. Being thus confronted with a lack of “hard” primary source material, I had to 
rely on “soft” primary sources (such as public justifications of politicians, e.g. parliamentary 
debates and publicly accessible official reports, or press reports) and secondary sources which 
offer an analysis of primary sources and, thus, often attempt to describe, explain or interpret 
primary sources (such as journal articles, academic books etc.). Yet, secondary sources 
sometimes also report facts which are based on “hard” primary sources. Where these “hard” 
sources are clearly discernable and not subject to interpretation or evaluation, I also partially 
relied on this “methodological compromise”, i.e. on the extraction of “hard” sources from 
secondary sources (see Moravcsik, 1998: 83). 
 
4. ‘Executive’ control powers and the birth of a parliamentary institution: the Common 
Assembly of the ECSC 
The principle of supranationality is usually portrayed as a novelty in the history of 
international politics which had its ‘breakthrough’ in the 1950s (Thiemeyer, 1998). According 
to Thiemeyer, “the first supranational organisation was the European Coal and Steel 
Community … The Member States delegated previously national competencies in the coal 
and steel sectors [to the new organisation].” (Thiemeyer, 1998: 6)
13 Jean Monnet, the 
                                                 
11 The conditions for a more comprehensive theory test would invoke two complementary strategies: Scrutiny of 
all those instances in which national governments have pooled and/or delegated sovereignty (where we would 
consequently expect a ‘legitimacy deficit’ to exist); conversely, one has to look at all instances of the EP’s 
empowerment and should then expect to observe that these instances have been preceded by a ‘legitimacy 
deficit’. 
12 Moravcsik writes that “the greater the difficulty of manipulating or concealing evidence of what really 
occurred at the time, the more reliable (the “harder”) the source in retrospect.” (Moravcsik, 1998: 81) 
13 Note that the following represents only a limited selection of the ample literature on the ‘Schuman Plan’ and 
the founding of the ECSC. See, for example, Racine (1954), Diebold (1959), Mosler (1966), Milward (1984),   11
mastermind behind the ‘Schuman Plan’, has provided ample references in his Memoirs to the 
deadlock and frustrations experienced as a result of most post-war inter-state cooperative 
efforts. The various security and economic challenges that Western Europe was facing at the 
time were not met with adequate international ‘organisational’ responses. One of the major 
‘culprits’ identified by Monnet which obstructed progress was the intergovernmental 
decision-making mode, prevalent in all extant organisations such as the OEEC or the Council 
of Europe (see Monnet, 1978: 271-73, Scalingi, 1980: 14-15, Duchêne, 1994: 187) Monnet’s 
verdict on the decision-making capacity of the ‘intergovernmental method’ was damaging, 
pronouncing that “inter-governmental systems, already weakened by the compromises built 
into them, were quickly paralysed by the rule that all decisions must be unanimous.” (Monnet, 
1978: 281) Yet, what could be done to overcome the paralysis of unanimity? Monnet states 
his solution clearly and unmistakably: “National sovereignty would have to be tackled more 
boldly and on a narrower front.” (Monnet, 1978: 274, emphasis added) The ‘Monnet Method’ 
was born: sectoral and gradual delegation of national sovereignty to common (supranational) 
institutions. 
 
The Schuman Plan, officially announced by foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 
in the Quai d’Orsay, combined economic- and security-induced motives for a new form of 
supranational inter-state cooperation.
14 In his memoirs, Monnet himself referred to his plan as 
a “bold, constructive act” and Duchêne labels it a “break with the past” mirrored in the 
proposal for a supranational organisational form (see Duchêne, 1994: 205). The conditio sina 
qua non of the plan was that the prospective Member States of the ECSC accepted the idea of 
the  delegation of sovereignty in the respective policy sectors to a supranational High 
Authority that had the power to make decisions binding on the Member States. This idea was 
espoused in the ‘Schuman Plan’ declaration of 9 May 1950 as follows: 
 
“By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose 
decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will 
lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation 
indispensable to the preservation of peace.”
 15 
 
The invention of supranationality and the perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’ 
With the supranational idea having firmly entered the realm of inter-state cooperation, we 
would expect – if proposition 1 holds – that the traditional logic of accountability in 
international politics, based on the unanimity principle and thus the unconditional veto right 
of national governments, would be subject to challenge and re-definition. Proposition 1 
stipulates that pooling and delegation of national sovereignty will produce an asymmetry 
between output and input legitimacy (a ‘democratic’ or ‘legitimacy deficit’. One of the central 
aims of the Schuman Plan was to overcome the paralysis of unanimity by delegating 
sovereignty to a supranational body whose decisions would be binding on the Member States. 
Consequently, it would surely not make sense if the newly designed supranational body was 
to be controlled by those whose independent decision-making power it should overcome. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Schwabe (1988), Gillingham (1991), Duchêne (1994), Featherstone (1994), Lappenküper (1994), Spierenburg 
and Poidevin (1994),. See also Adenauer’s and Monnet’s memoirs (Adenauer, 1965; Monnet, 1978). 
14 Lynch stresses, however, that besides the economic importance of Monnet’s plan, the political and even moral 
aspects of the plan were rather more crucial: “Economic details were of secondary importance. It is true that 
[Monnet] did not commission a detailed examination of the relative costs in the French and German coal and 
steel industries … before making the proposal.” (Lynch, 1988: 124; see also Monnet, 1978: 289-292) 
15 See Leiden University, History Department, EU History, History of European Integration-site 
<http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/declaration.html> (accessed in June 2002).   12
It was hence the question of the democratic accountability of the new supranational organ, the 
High Authority, which caused fierce debates about the locus of legitimacy and sovereignty 
even before the official negotiations of the Schuman Plan had taken off. The ‘accountability-
question’ was most resolutely advanced by the governments in Brussels and The Hague. Dirk 
Spierenburg, leader of the Dutch delegation, warned his government about the potential role 
of the High Authority claiming that it was likely to represent a congregation of experts 
exercising some form of dictatorship over national coal and steel industries (Griffiths, 1990: 
265-266). Reactions of similar kind echoed from Brussels where it was demanded that the 
High Authority had to be held at bay and could not go uncontrolled (Küsters, 1988: 78-79). 
These concerns about the potential pre-eminence of the High Authority in the political system 
of the ECSC voiced prior to the beginning of the negotiations led Monnet to reflect more 
intensely on control mechanisms that could be instituted vis-à-vis the High Authority 
(Lappenküper, 1994: 418). He saw clearly that transfers of sovereignty to the High Authority 
would be unacceptable without adequate mechanisms to control the ‘executive’ High 




Yet, the question about the democratic control of the High Authority was far from being 
settled. The fact that this question proved so ‘nagging’ for all participants showed that the 
(partial) delegation of sovereignty to a supranational body was perceived to constitute a new 
layer of governance which had to be subject to principles of democratic control and 
accountability. While the evidence presented in this section provides strong support for 
proposition 1, it also hinted at the observation that the governments participating in the 
Schuman Plan-negotiations were far from agreement on the appropriate form of control 
mechanisms that should be created to keep the High Authority accountable. 
 
Tackling the ‘legitimacy deficit’ 
The statements laid down in the previous paragraphs indicate that the different governments 
offered a variety of different arguments to express their preferred solutions to the question of 
accountability. According to proposition 2, we would expect that alternative proposals to 
create and reform institutions with a view to reducing the asymmetry between input and 
output legitimacy (i.e. the ‘legitimacy deficit’) are likely to reflect differences in ‘legitimating 
beliefs’ held by different political elites. While the German and French responses to the 
‘accountability’-problem were guided predominantly by a Federal State ‘legitimating belief’, 
the Benelux countries’ institutional response was strongly influenced by the dominance of 
socio-economic objectives and support of the Economic Community ‘legitimating’ belief. 
 
One member of the German delegation to the Schuman Plan’s legal affairs committee, stated 
that “during the course of the first days of the conference of delegates it became apparent that 
… the grand issues of constitutional politics must not be neglected: the distribution of 
functions between governing organs ... The necessity to control the High Authority was 
immediately obvious. All governments were parliamentary democracies.” (Mosler, 1966: 369, 
author’s translation). Monnet, in a similar vein, argued that “[i]n a world where government 
authority is derived from representative parliamentary assemblies, Europe cannot be built 
without such an assembly.”
17 Time and again, Hallstein, Ophüls and other prominent 
members of the German delegation justified their institutional proposals by taking recourse to 
the Federal State ‘legitimating belief’. Although the French and German delegations were 
equally aware of a ‘legitimacy deficit’ if the High Authority was not subject to some form of 
parliamentary control, their arguments to support or oppose certain proposed institutional 
                                                 
16 MAEF.DECE: Déclarations à la Presse anglo-américaine, 8 June 1950. 
17 AA/PA.SFSP – 62, 11 July 1950 (author’s translation).   13
control mechanisms differed nevertheless. The head of the German delegation, Walter 
Hallstein, emphasised these differences by criticising the French draft memorandum on 
institutions:  
 
“… The Common Assembly cannot be viewed as an organ representing the interests 
of different individual states, but is – by its very nature – a unitary organ, because 
control over a unitary organ [the High Authority] can only be ensured by a unitary 
organ, otherwise one would deny the supranational nature of the High Authority. On 
the other hand, the ministerial committee represents the interests of states … The 
European Union … will have a Federal State-like character, in which the 
representation of individual states’ interests is, after all, legitimate. Despite making 
reference to the example of the United States of America it was a difficult enterprise 
to make some of the French Gentlemen understand the concept of a Federal State, 
given that they – understandably – are used to depart from the tradition of the French 
unitary state. … [T]here was agreement that the Common Assembly had to be 
strengthened … beyond what the French working document envisaged. To justify 
this necessity, Hallstein drew attention to the logic of a federal constitution, in which 
the state [or unit]-element had to be balanced by a federal-element unless one would 
want to stop at the stage of a confederation ...”
18 
 
While there was agreement on basic constitutional principles (parliamentary accountability of 
the ‘executive’ High Authority), the French and German delegations were not completely at 
one regarding the exact role of the Common Assembly and the scope of its powers: Given the 
German delegation’s firm adherence to a Federal State ‘legitimating beliefs’, the French 
delegation was not guided by an equally well-defined Leitbild, although – on a number of 
occasions – Monnet underlined that the ultimate goal was to create a federal institutional set-
up




The  Federal State ‘legitimating belief’ was furthermore exemplified in the German 
delegation’s proposal for a unicameral or, alternatively, a bicameral ‘Montan-Kongress’
21 
which should be the counter-weight to the High Authority, the executive organ (Gerçek, 1998: 
108-109). Congruent with the conception of the Common Assembly as a legislature, Germany 
favoured a strong parliament with real decision-making and budgetary powers rather than a 
weak parliament which would be only endowed with control powers.
22 French scepticism 
with regard to the powers of the assembly (as well as with regard to the ‘second’ federal 
element, the Council of Ministers representing the individual state’s interests) thus has to be 
seen (a) against the background of a lack of ‘familiarity’ with a federal institutional set-up, 
and, more importantly, (b) in the context of their strong preference for a largely unconstrained 
High Authority. 
 
                                                 
18 AA/PA.SFSP – 62, 27 July 1950 (author’s translation). 
19 See, for example, AA/PA.SFSP – 102, 26 July 1950 where it reads (in the original): “Der Vorsitzende 
(Monnet, Frankreich) betonte, dass das politische Leitbild die Schaffung von föderalen Organen sei.”  
20 See, for example, AA/PA.SFSP – 102, 10 August 1950. 
21 The following alternatives of a ‘Montan-Kongress’ were considered. The first included a Council of Ministers 
as ‘first chamber’ and a European Parliament as ‘second chamber’ (“dualistic solution”). The second was 
conceived as a one-chamber assembly in which one half would be composed of members of parliament elected 
from the ranks of national parliamentarians and the other half of delegates of the different governments 
(“monistic solution”) (see Gerçek, 1998: 108-109). 
22 See, for example, AA/PA.SFSP – 102, 10 August 1950, AA/PA.SFSP – 103, 20 July 1950.   14
The position of the Benelux governments with regard to the creation and powers of the 
Common Assembly was strongly informed by the Economic Community ‘legitimating belief’. 
In the eyes of the Benelux governments the new supranational polity derived its legitimacy 
essentially from the prospect that delegation would provide effective and efficient solution to 
economic interdependencies while, at the same time, interference with domestic socio-
economic policy objectives by the High Authority had to be ruled out (B. Rittberger, 2001: 
691-694). The creation of the Common Assembly, if endowed with legislative powers – as 
proposed by Germany – did not meet these requirements. Furthermore, the Benelux 
governments stressed that the High Authority had to be held at bay, in order to prevent it from 
interfering with domestic policy objectives, and consequently, the role for national 
governments in a ministerial council was emphasised.
23 The Benelux countries accepted the 
Common Assembly as an element of the institutional structure of the ECSC, under the 
condition that it did not have any legislative powers and hence could affect policies in a 
potentially unpredictable and -controllable manner. Why was this the case? First, the Benelux 
countries accepted the argument employed by France and Germany that the partial delegation 
of sovereignty embodied by the new supranational High Authority needed to be equally 
controlled by a supranational body, a parliamentary assembly. In a discussion with Monnet, 
Suétens was reported to have subscribed to the following argument: 
 
“Given that the High Authority is not accountable to governments, yet given that it 
has to be accountable to some institution, the only body to realise this accountability 
was a representation of the sovereignty of the people.”
24 
 
Secondly, a parliamentary body that possessed ‘executive’ control powers (censure motion) 
was considered unproblematic or even beneficial because it provided an additional ‘check’ on 
the High Authority. Consequently, a parliamentary institution endowed solely with control 




5. Budgetary powers: the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970
26 
It can be considered an irony in the European Community’s development that the Member 
State pressing most strongly for the completion of a common market for agricultural products, 
France, was most reluctant to accept the institutional consequences of creating a common 
agricultural market: Whereas the creation of a system of own resources (stemming from 
agricultural levies on agricultural imports) was accepted as necessary corollary of the creation 
of a common market for agricultural products, another seemingly logical corollary was 
contested vehemently: the extension of the EP’s budgetary powers in the light of the decline 
of national parliament’s budgetary powers. 
 
The creation of ‘own resources’ and the perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’ 
Despite all the public rhetoric about retaining the ‘grandeur’ of France, one of Charles de 
Gaulle’s primary policy objective was to secure financial advantages for French agriculture 
within a common European market for agricultural products since French agricultural 
products were only competitive within Europe but not on world market scale (see Moravcsik, 
                                                 
23 AAPD – 1949/50, No 84, 3 July 1950 (author’s translation). See also AA/PA.SFSP – 62, 11 July 1950. 
24 AAPD – 1949/50, No 89, 11 July 1950 (author’s translation). 
25 “Tout en doutant de son opportunité quant aux garanties qu’elle pourrait offrir dans la réalité, on peut penser 
que sa création dans les conditions prévues au projet ne comporterait pas d’inconvénients majeurs.” (JMDS.A-
07.02-000073: Schuman Plan and the Belgian Response, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Fonds van der 
Meulen 5216, Jan-Juin 1950, Schuman Plan; Cabinet du Jurisconsulte [Note de J. Mûuls concernant le projet de 
traité relative au charbon et à l’acier, rédaction du Plan Schuman du 8 novembre 1950].) 
26 Parts of this section are based on Lindner and Rittberger (2002).   15
1998: 179, Moravcsik, 2000). Following the Council’s request, the Commission presented 
proposals regarding the creation of a system of own resources to the Council in March and 
April 1965.
27 The Commission affirmed in its proposals that the changes envisaged as a result 
of the creation of own resources would render a re-examination of the budgetary procedure as 
laid down in Article 203 EEC
28 necessary, in particular those provisions affecting the EP’s 
role in the budgetary procedure. However, when the Council met to discuss the Commission’s 
proposals in late June, no agreement was found, and in the night of 30 June-1 July 1965, the 
French representative left the negotiating table triggering what was to become known as the 
‘empty chair crisis’. For the purpose of this article, it is not necessary to re-capitulate the 
motivations held by the different actors that finally produced the ‘empty chair crisis’ (see, for 
example, Lambert, 1966; Newhouse, 1967).
29 It is important to bear in mind that attempts to 
create a system of own resources which would bypass national budgetary procedures were 
under way in the early 1960s, and that they would, almost inevitably, re-surface sooner rather 
than later. 
 
Following de Gaulle’s resignation in the summer of 1969, France immediately launched a 
new initiative to achieve a permanent financial settlement for the CAP. On 16 July 1969 the 
Commission, again, proposed to replace Member States’ national contributions with a system 
of own resources together with proposals to alter the budgetary procedure. At their meeting in 
The Hague on 1-2 December 1969, the heads of government of the six Community member 
States agreed, inter alia, on the creation of a system of own resources (according to Article 
201 EEC Treaty) and a concomitant reform of the budgetary procedure (Article 203 EEC 
Treaty). A final agreement on a Community system of own resources and the concomitant 
Treaty changes was not reached until April 1970 (see Coombes, 1972: 27). The agreement 
foresaw that, after a transition period, from 1 January 1975 onwards “all agricultural levies 
and customs duties will be paid directly to the Communities’ budget” (Coombes, 1972: 27). 
The so-called Luxembourg Treaty signed the following day (22 April 1970) amended the 
original Treaty providing for a reformed budgetary procedure.
30 
 
Following proposition 1, we would expect pooling and delegation of national sovereignty to 
produce an asymmetry between output and input legitimacy (a ‘democratic’ or ‘legitimacy 
deficit’). The events of 1970 represent an instance of delegation, with national governments 
(and parliaments) transferring authority for the levying of resources to the Community-level. 
Hence, if proposition 1 holds, we would expect political elites in the Member States and 
Community institutions to express concerns about a ‘legitimacy deficit’ resulting from the 
decision to delegate certain budgetary competencies to the Community and the concomitant 
exacerbation of the asymmetry between input and output legitimacy. 
 
As soon as the discussion about the creation of own resources surfaced, calls for an extension 
of the EP’s budgetary powers came to the forefront. The Commission, the European 
Parliament and most national governments advocated that a link be established between the 
                                                 
27 EP (1970: 71-82) provides a synopsis of the different proposals. 
28 The relevant sections of the non-amended Article 203 EEC read as follows: “3. The Council shall, by a 
qualified majority vote, draw up the draft budget and then transmit it to the Assembly. … The Assembly shall be 
entitled to propose to the Council amendments to the draft budget. 4. If, within the period of one month from the 
receipt of the draft budget, the Assembly has given its approval, or has not made its opinion known to the 
Council, the draft budget shall be considered as finally adopted. If, within this period, the Assembly has 
proposed any amendments, the draft budget so amended shall be transmitted to the Council. The Council shall 
then discuss it with the Commission and, where appropriate, with the other institutions concerned and shall 
finally adopted the budget by qualified majority vote.” 
29 See also AAPD, 1965 [No. 248, 265, 266, 267, 272]. 
30 Extracts from both documents can be found in Coombes (1972: 91-102).   16
creation of a Community system of own resources and the empowerment of the EP in the 
budgetary sphere. Although proposals to extend the EP’s powers had been around for a 
considerable while,
31 the time seemed ripe for the launch of a new endeavour to extend the 
EP’s powers. The Dutch permanent representative to the European Communities made it clear 
that, with the creation of the EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund), 
national parliaments were to lose control of a considerable sum of expenditures that would 
become genuine Community expenditures. It was therefore considered necessary to establish 
an appropriate approval and oversight mechanism the use of these funds on the supranational 
level, exercised by the EP.
32 Yet, the French government continuously disputed that such a 
link actually existed.
33 Interestingly, although it was not admitted publicly, French internal 
government documents provide evidence that the argument about the fading of national 
parliament’s budgetary control powers was taken seriously.
34 After de Gaulle’s resignation, 
President Georges Pompidou and the new Gaullist government pushed for resuming talks on 
the issue of completing the common market for agricultural products and the creation of a 
permanent financing arrangement. In the aftermath of the summit in The Hague, the 
discussion as far as it affected the EP’s budgetary powers ceased to centre on the question if 
there should be an extension at all but instead represented one in which questions of ‘degree-
ism’ prevailed. France had accepted the ‘logic’, yet its exact implications remained in dispute: 
what role should the European Parliament be allowed to play in the budgetary procedure? 
 
So far, reactions to the prospect of creating a system of own resources (i.e. delegating 
budgetary powers to be exercised by the Community) provide ample support for proposition 
1: When delegation ‘looms’, concerns about an asymmetry between input and output 
legitimacy are not very far off. After the issue of delegation itself was shelved (as was, 
consequently, the issue about the extension of the European Parliament’s budgetary powers) 
following the French government’s ‘empty chair’-decisions, it took almost four years until the 
same issues were taken up again. 
 
How to tackle the ‘legitimacy deficit’? 
If proposition 2 holds we would expect alternative proposals to create and reform institutions 
with a view to reducing the asymmetry between input and output legitimacy (i.e. the 
‘legitimacy deficit’) to reflect differences in ‘legitimating beliefs’ held by different political 
elites. Did national governments’ proposals hence reflect alternative ‘blue-prints’ of how (and 
if at all) democracy should be exercised at the supranational level? 
 
In his address to the National Assembly on 4 November 1969, the French Minster for Foreign 
Affairs Maurice Schuman referred to the French government’s commitment to advance 
Community affairs by dealing with the triple objectives of achèvement, renforcement and 
élargissement at the forthcoming summit in The Hague. He pointed to the centrality of the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the establishment of a permanent financing arrangement 
before accession negotiations with the UK could  begin, yet the government did not mention 
the potential institutional consequences of instituting a new Community financing 
                                                 
31 For example, the German government, referring to a Council decision of 30 July 1963, called upon COREPER 
to study proposals about the strengthening the Assembly’s powers. The German government demanded 
improved mechanisms of consultation between the Community organs. A proposal of the Luxembourg 
government played a similar tune, i.e. calling for extension of the consultation procedure to areas where no such 
consultations were yet foreseen (MAEF.DECE-05.02, MAEF 1124, 18 December 1963). 
32 See MAEF.DECE-05.02, MAEF 1124, 18 December 1963; see also AAPD, 1965 [No 243] for a reference to a 
resolution adopted by the Dutch Second Chamber calling for the extension of the EP’s budgetary powers once a 
system of own resources is introduced. 
33 See AAPD, 1965 [No 219]. 
34 See MAEF.DECE-05.02, MAEF 1124, 10 May 1965.   17
arrangement, and no reference was made to the proposals about enhancing the EP’s budgetary 
powers.
35 While, in private, questions about the input legitimacy of the new financing 
arrangement were addressed,
36 the government was either tacit in this respect, or downplayed 
any potential concerns in public. MPs from the governing UDR (Union des Démocrates pour 
la République) were openly critical with regard to the potential institutional implications of 
implementing the objectives agreed upon in The Hague. Gaullist MPs did not view a solution 
to the ‘legitimacy deficit’ in the empowerment of a supranational parliamentary institution. 
The governments in the Council had to remain the key decision-makers, especially since they 
were ultimately responsible to national MPs.
37 In contrast to the government’s line before de 
Gaulle’s resignation, which posited that the empowerment of supranational institutions, such 
as the Commission and the EP, was unacceptable – as the 1965-1966 ‘empty chair crisis’ 
demonstrated –, under Pompidou’s Presidency, the Gaullist government was primarily 
interested in locking in sectoral commitments, i.e. a favourable arrangement on the CAP
38 
even if this involved the selective delegation of sovereignty. However, in order not to upset 
‘rank and file’ Gaullists, the potential institutional implications of such decisions (more 
‘supranationality’, weakening of the domestic parliament) had to be downplayed. Yet, 
concerning proposals for enhancing the EP’s budgetary powers, the Gaullists remained firm 
supporters of an Intergovernmental Cooperation ‘legitimating belief’ viewing the EP’s 
participation as an obstacle to rather than a source of input legitimacy. 
 
Not only did the question about the empowerment of the EP assume a much more prominent 
position in the debates in the run-up to the summit in The Hague in the other five Member 
States, most governments also firmly committed themselves to press for an extension of its 
powers. This section will take the discussions in the Netherlands and Germany concerning 
Community reform in the 1960s as exemplary for those in most other Member States. 
 
In Germany, all political parties represented in the Bundestag at the time, Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU), Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP) agreed on the trajectory of German 
policy towards Europe and its ultimate goal, a federal Europe, organised according to the 
principles of parliamentary democracy.
39 When the question of Community reform surfaced 
in the second half of 1969, both the opposition (CDU/CSU) and political parties of the 
government coalition (SPD and FDP) supported institutional reform destined at an extension 
of the EP’s powers and a ‘democratisation’ of the Community’s institutional structure in the 
context of the proposed delegation of budgetary powers to the Community. When the MPs 
Hallstein and Wagner from the CDU/CSU, then in opposition, asked Walter Scheel, the 
foreign minister of the new SPD-FDP coalition government, whether the new government 
would continue to press for the application of Treaties (indicating support for majority voting) 
and champion the extension of the powers of the EP in the wake of the creation of a 
                                                 
35 Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, debate of 4 November 1969: 3301. 
36 An internal document of the Quai d’Orsay refers to the Commission proposals of 1965: “… il s’agirait 
d’étendre les prérogatives de l’Assemblée sous prétexte que le budget comprendrait désormais des ressources 
propres et non plus seulement des contributions financières des Etats membres. Mais il faut bien voir que le droit 
d’initiative en matière de recettes appartient seulement au Conseil. En effet, c’est lui qui fixe le montant des 
prélèvements et le niveau du tarif douanier commun. Vouloir … étendre les prérogatives de l’Assemblée en 
matière budgétaire reviendrait en définitive à lui donner seulement plus de pouvoirs pour agir sur les dépenses de 
la Communauté. Sous prétexte de démocratie, l’on cèderait à la démagogie du gaspillage, dont il est superflu de 
rappeler qu’elle a toujours été, dans tous les pays, une tentation très forte pour les représentants du peuple. ‘Le 
budget, monstre énorme, admirable poisson auquel de tout côté on jette l’hameçon’ disait Victor Hugo.” 
(MAEF.DECE-05.02, MAEF 1124, 10 May 1965) 
37 Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, debate of 4 November 1969 (see Jacques Vendroux’s address). 
38 See, for example, AAPD, 1969 [No 319]. 
39 See, for example, resolutions 4/1104 of 15 May 1964, 4/1660 of 23 November 1963, 4/2211 and 4/2212 of 28 
April 1964.   18
Community financing system based on own resources, the foreign minister responded in the 
affirmative.
40 Reporting on the summit in The Hague of early December, Chancellor Willy 
Brandt made reference to the planned reform of the Community financing system and 
indicated support for the argument that there was a direct link between the creation of own 
resources and reform of the budgetary procedure and the extension of the EP’s powers.
41 
Walter Scheel played to the same tune and stressed that the government would spare no 
efforts to press for an extension of the EP’s powers: 
 
“… all delegations have underlined the importance to extend the competencies of the 
EP, because it is essential that once we walk down the path of a system of own resources 
it cannot be that parliamentary control would not be continuously adjusted from 
extended to fully-fledged budgetary powers.”
42 
 
The major political parties in the Netherlands were probably the most outspoken supporters of 
a ‘democratisation’ of European governance in the period under scrutiny. Foreign minister 
Joseph Luns committed himself and his government to a far-reaching extension of the 
European Parliament’s competencies, not only in the budgetary but also in the legislative 
sphere. Already in 1964, when both the introduction of qualified majority voting (following 
the end of the transition period foreseen in the EEC Treaty) and the reform of the 
Community’s financing system were on the Community’s agenda he mentioned during a 
Council meeting that a key issue facing the Community had, so far, not been dealt with 
adequately: the future development of the Community’s democratic credentials: 
 
“The legislative and executive powers in the Community are presently exercised 
principally by the Council and the Commission. On the European level we do not see 
the balance [of powers] which exists in our national constitutions as concerns the 
relationship between the executive and parliament. In the legislative domain, with 
regard to the adoption of the budget and the control of Council acts, the Community 
lacks a genuine parliamentary authority.”
43 
 
Throughout the 1960s, the Dutch position regarding Community reform can be characterised 
by its consistency and ongoing commitment to democratise Community decision-making, 
with a particular focus on the powers of the EP. The ‘Five’ hence departed from very different 
assumptions about European governance than the Gaullists. One marked contrast was the 
assumption that sovereignty was not indivisible but that it could be shared across levels of 
governance (a notion that Pompidou was more receptive to than de Gaulle). Shared 
sovereignty therefore required the creation of democratic control and accountability-
mechanisms at the European level. Consequently, the ‘Five’ considered that the ‘legitimacy 
deficit’ could be best resolved by strengthening the role of the EP at the Community level. 
 
How could the two views, the Intergovernmental Cooperation ‘legitimating belief’ held by 
the French government and the Federal State ‘legitimating belief held by the ‘Five’, be 
reconciled? Following the summit in The Hague, the question of the EP’s budgetary powers 
continued to be subject to extensive debate although the French government and President had 
accepted the ‘logic’ linking the creation of own resources and some form of EP participation. 
Although bilateral talks between the Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas and Chancellor Brandt in 
the aftermath of The Hague confirmed the divergence in positions between France and the 
                                                 
40 Deutscher Bundestag, questions of 6 November 1969: 279 and 283. 
41 Deutscher Bundestag, debate of 3 December 1969: 593. 
42 Deutscher Bundestag, debate of 3 December 1969: 600 (author’s translation). 
43 MAEF.DECE-05.02, MAEF 1124, 3 December 1964.   19
other ‘Five’, Chaban-Delmas agreed that the EP should be given control competencies, but 
insisted that the Council’s role had to be respected and “financial demagogy” prevented. Most 
importantly, the “Strasbourg Assembly” should not be able to demand powers that exceeded 
those of national parliaments.
44 Brandt mentioned that the question of the EP’s powers must 
not be oversimplified by pointing at the trouble he could run into vis-à-vis his own 
parliament, the Bundestag, if he would not devote sufficient attention to the issue.
45 A 
solution to the problem was found by the Council in a meeting in February 1970. A 
distinction introduced by the French government between expenditure items that followed 
directly from Community legal acts (compulsory expenditure) and expenditure that did not, 
such as administrative expenses (non-compulsory expenditure), was accepted albeit 
grudgingly by some delegations (the Dutch delegation most notably) as it gave the EP a final 
say over only about 4-5% of the entire Community expenditure, i.e. non-compulsory 
expenditure. 
 
6. The European Parliament and legislative powers: the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty (addendum) 
Following the delegation of control and budgetary powers to the EP, some thirty-five years 
after its creation, the introduction of the co-operation procedure in the SEA finally endowed 




The pooling of sovereignty and the perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’ 
The events leading to the adoption of the SEA are well documented and will not be repeated 
here.
47 Yet, to explain the national governments’ decision to agree to a broadening of the EP’s 
powers by bestowing it with “conditional agenda-setting power” (Tsebelis, 1994) in the newly 
designed legislative procedure it is essential to consider those Treaty changes which induced 
governments to reconsider the EP’s powers, i.e. instances of pooling and delegation. 
Recalling proposition 1, we would expect pooling and delegation of national sovereignty to 
produce an asymmetry between output and input legitimacy (a ‘democratic’ or ‘legitimacy 
deficit’). 
 
The introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council and its application to virtually all 
matters relating to the creation of an internal market was one of the quintessential features of 
the SEA. All national governments came to the conclusion that this large extent of pooling 
sovereignty was acceptable or even desirable given the objective to pass almost 300 pieces of 
Community legislation until the end of 1992, the target date for the completion of the internal 
market. Pooling was thus expected to partly fulfil the function of speeding up decision-
making by making it more demanding to muster a blocking minority and also to demonstrate 
the Member States’ commitment to advance the internal market programme (see Moravcsik, 
1998: ch. 5). In sum, pooling had become a crucial underpinning of the Community’s ‘re-
launch’ in the mid 1980s. Proposition 1 suggests that pooling ‘did not come alone’. We 
would expect that – at the same time that political elites supported pooling – the ‘legitimacy 
deficit’ would be exacerbated if the input dimension of legitimacy was not emphasised in 
institutional reform efforts. 
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Although certain national governments, members of national parliaments and the EP have, 
throughout the 1980s, consistently criticised that the Community suffered from a ‘democratic 
deficit’ (see Corbett, 1998), it was the potential impact of pooling (i.e. the introduction of 
qualified majority voting) and the ensuing prospect for a reform of the EEC Treaty, that made 
the prospect of an empowerment of the EP in the legislative domain increasingly likely. There 
is ample evidence that domestic political elites were well aware of the link between the 
proposals for pooling and the concomitant challenges to input legitimacy. For example, at the 
European Council summit meeting in Fontainebleau in June 1984, an ad hoc committee 
composed of personalities appointed by the governments of the Member States was created to 
discuss the pressing issues of deeper cooperation and institutional reform (the so-called 
‘Dooge Committee’). In its final report to the Brussels European Council in late March 1985, 
the Dooge Committee advocated, inter alia, the creation of a ‘fully integrated internal market’ 
and simultaneous institutional reform in order to achieve the policy goals set out by the report. 
A plea was made for the provision of more ‘efficient’ but also for more ‘democratic’ 
institutions. A majority of Member State representatives wanted the EP to play a more 




Parliamentary debates and resolutions in many of the national parliaments equally reflected 
the awareness that increased pooling would exacerbate the ‘legitimacy deficit’.
49 In France, 
for example, Charles Josselin, a Socialist MP said before the Assemblée Nationale that “… 
the process embarked upon will lead … to a considerable reduction of the competences of 
national parliaments in almost all domains”
50, and in a similar vein, the centre-right politician 
Adrien Zeller (UDF – Union pour la démocratie française)  emphasised that “the only means 
to re-establish democratic control of such decisions [which evade national parliamentary 
control] is to endow the European Parliament with the means not just to influence Community 
decisions but also to legitimise them by its votes.”
51 In Germany, the governing Christian 
Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Liberals (FDP) as well as the opposition Social Democrats (SPD) 
were very explicit about the challenges further pooling posed for procedural legitimacy. For 
example, the chair of the EC Committee, Renate Hellwig (CDU), criticised the executive 
dominance of Community decision-making and concluded that to reduce the ‘legitimacy 
deficit’ the legislative powers of the European Parliament had to be increased.
52 
 
Overall, a number of national governments, either pressured by the domestic political parties 
and the European Parliament alike, invoked the need to compensate national democratic 
constituencies for the expected loss of national parliaments’ capacity to hold their national 
executives to account once qualified majority voting became a reality, by strengthening the 
legislative powers of the EP. While the evidence presented here provides an indication that 
the prospect for pooling increased the demands for alleviating the widening asymmetry 
between output and input legitimacy, it was also pointed out that political elites from different 
Member States were not fully at one with regard to proposals as to how the perceived 
‘legitimacy deficit’ could be reduced. 
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Alleviating the ‘legitimacy deficit’ 
With the ‘legitimacy deficit’ threatening to get exacerbated once pooling (qualified majority 
voting) was in place, national governments advanced different proposals, guided by 
alternative ‘legitimating beliefs’, to remedy this problem. According to proposition 2, 
alternative proposals to create and reform institutions with a view to reducing the asymmetry 
between  input and output legitimacy (i.e. the ‘legitimacy deficit’) are likely to reflect 
differences in ‘legitimating beliefs’ held by different political elites. 
 
In his address to the European Parliament in May 1984, President Mitterrand indicated that 
the French government was willing to support the ‘widening’ of integration by including new 
policy areas and for ‘deepening’ through institutional reform. Mitterrand picked up on the 
notion of ‘European Union’ and committed himself to the convening of an IGC among 
interested Member States, yet he remained silent on the question of the ‘democratisation’ of 
Community governance, although he expressed himself in favour of improved coordination 
between the Council and the EP (Gaddum, 1994: 239). Despite rather vague statements from 
the side of government representatives and the President, the French Socialist Party showed 
consistent support for EU-level ‘democratisation’ (Jachtenfuchs, 1999: 177). Prior to the 
launch of the IGC, MPs (but also some government officials) claimed that the pooling of 
sovereignty necessitated accountability mechanisms compensating for the loss of national 
parliaments’ influence at the European level. Foreign Affairs Minister Roland Dumas 
expressed his conviction that “the Community will manifest … a willingness to reform 
institutional practices by making use of … the democratic legitimacy provided by the 
European Parliament.”
53 Socialist MP Josselin pointed out that pooling meant that national 
parliaments’ power to influence Community decision-making and to control its outcomes 
increasingly faded: 
 
“Against the background of the weakening of national parliaments’ powers, the 
European Parliament … has, for long, embodied an opportunity, and maybe still does: 
being capable of controlling the proliferation of Community legislation. … All in all, we 
national parliamentarians will have to seek consolation for our decline in the thought 
that the substitute [for our loss in competencies] has been acquired in Strasbourg, by 




Whereas the Socialist Party was guided by a Federal State ‘legitimating belief’ in its 
approach to tackling the ‘legitimacy deficit’, considering the EP as the ‘appropriate’ venue in 
which those decisions should be co-decided that have escaped the input by national 
parliamentary institutions, the French government, and President Mitterrand in particular, 
were shunning away from openly committing themselves to the empowerment of the EP 
(Budden, 1994: 326-327). Any indications that could be seen as support for the EP’s 
empowerment could be seen as rhetorical devices.
55 
 
It has often been underlined in the literature and by policy-makers alike that one of the 
defining features of German policy towards European integration is the continuing existence 
of a multi-party consensus.
56 Prior to the SEA, the governing CDU/CSU-FDP coalition called 
on the government, inter alia, to “1. take irrevocable decisions towards the creation of 
European Union, 2. enhance the legislative powers of the European Parliament, 3. apply the 
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Rome Treaties and enhance the scope of majority decision-making …”
57 Agreement existed 
among the German political elites that the ‘democratisation’ of policy-making had to target 
the European level and, if this was to be achieved, could only materialise through 
empowering the EP. In contrast to the relatively vague statements from the French 
government, Chancellor Kohl expressed his support for the empowerment of the EP and 
committed himself to pursue that course of action during the IGC. Taking recourse to an 
institutional analogy from German federalism, Kohl affirmed: 
 
“In Milan, we intend to press for an empowerment of the European Parliament. … We 
are ready to make considerable advances on this issue, given that … in the area of 
Community policies there are a number of developments which are outside any form of 
parliamentary control. … Furthermore, we hold the view – based on our experience 
between the power-play for a balance between the Bundestag and Bundesrat and the 
Conciliation Committee [Vermittlungsausschuß] – that it must be possible to pursue a 




The British Conservative party had a very different vision of what it considered desirable and 
appropriate with regard to the reform of the European polity. In her memoirs, Margaret 
Thatcher summarised the Conservative party’s ideal Europe as a “free enterprise Europe des 
patries” (Thatcher, 1993: 536). A memorandum distributed by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office rejects the “submerging” of sovereignties under the label of a “United 
States of Europe”, and supports “greater unity” as long as this connotes “Europe united as a 
single market.” The Conservatives were willing to ‘relegate’ institutional issues to the realm 
of the ‘practical’ (‘which procedures are most likely to help the realisation of the internal 
market?’) rather than treat them as ‘dogmatic’ issues (‘the national veto must be kept at all 
costs’) although a considerable number of back-benchers rejected the (even selective and by 
no means enthusiastic) support for more qualified majority voting on issues affecting the 
completion of the internal market. The government repeatedly had to give assurances that the 
Luxembourg Compromise would remain intact and would, hence, not affect the sovereignty 
of Westminster.
59 While the majority position in the Conservative party and the government 
was willing to go along with the selective use of qualified majority voting, there was open 
rejection of the view that the EP had to be empowered in order to render Community 
decision-making more democratic; enhanced consultation and participation seemed to be 
acceptable as long as it did not hamper the decision-making effectiveness and efficiency. 
However, neither would an increase in the decision-making powers of the EP enhance 
decision-making efficiency (rather the contrary), nor would this lead to a ‘democratisation’ of 
Community decision-making in the eyes of the UK government and Conservative Party: 
 
“… the present balance of power reflects the role and importance of national 
parliaments to whom members of the Council, as representatives of the governments of 
Member States, are answerable. Any change in the balance of power between the 
Council and the European Parliament would diminish the ability of national Parliaments 
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to control Community policies, and their financing for which they would nonetheless 
remain answerable to national electorates.”
60 
 
Contrary to the French Socialists and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Germany, the 
Conservative Party rejected the view that a parliamentary institution at the European level 
could be a source of democratic legitimacy, a view that reflects the UK governments 
adherence to the Economic Community ‘legitimating belief’. The insistence and the 
corresponding belief in the parliamentary sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, blended 
in elements of the Intergovernmental Cooperation ‘legitimating belief’: The widespread 
demand, not only among backbenchers, that national parliamentary sovereignty had to emerge 
unscathed from any attempts to reform the Treaty was difficult to meet in reality by the 
government if it took the application of qualified majority voting seriously, and, therefore, 
rhetorical assurances that the Westminster Parliament remained the ultimate source of 
sovereignty were repeatedly pronounced by members of government. In this context, 
empowering the EP could not contribute anything to reduce the ‘legitimacy deficit’, apart 
from slowing down decision-making. Despite opposition of the UK government (as well as 
that of Denmark) to giving the EP a more effective role in the legislative decision-making 
process that went beyond mere consultation, the actual Treaty outcome represented a 
substantial increase in the EP’s legislative powers. Those national governments, most notably 
Germany and Italy, which were domestically committed to the Federal State ‘legitimating 
belief’ were strongly pressing for its empowerment. Given the substantial benefits of the 
internal market programme, the UK government acquiesced with regard to the question of the 
EP’s empowerment, which, according to one commentator, constituted only a ‘minor 
inconvenience’ in the end.
61 
 
Addendum: The Maastricht Treaty and the extension of the European Parliament’s 
legislative powers 
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 was accompanied by considerable 
transfers of national sovereignty through pooling and delegation: The creation of a single 
currency and an independent central bank implied the delegation of monetary policy 
competencies from the domestic to the supranational level. Similarly, qualified majority 
voting (‘pooling’) was extended and now covered a wider range of policy areas than was the 
case under the SEA. 
 
Delegation: Creation of a single currency and an independent European Central Bank 
At the time the SEA was negotiated, François Mitterrand had already pressed for closer 
monetary policy cooperation in the SEA. In October 1987, he called for a European central 
bank and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur followed suit in January 1988 by proposing a 
single currency. Despite the seeming scepticism on the part of some members of the German 
government and the Italian government, the meeting of the European Council in Hanover on 
27-28 June 1988 produced a timetable which included future steps toward EMU (see 
Moravcsik, 1998: 434). Despite Thatcher’s immediate opposition to a proposed creation of a 
single currency and a central bank, the proposal by Kohl and Mitterrand to set up a committee 
which would debate a schedule for monetary integration went ahead and Jacques Delors was 
appointed chair of the Committee on EMU (see Ross, 1995: 81). The so-called ‘Delors 
Committee’ produced a report which put forward a three-stage plan towards the realisation of 
EMU and became the basis of subsequent European Council discussions at Madrid, 
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Strasbourg, Dublin and Rome where, in October 1990, the opening of the IGC for December 
was officially mandated. The Report foresaw the removal of all barriers to the free flow of 
goods and services as well as the elimination of capital controls. During the first stage, there 
would be closer coordination of the economic and monetary policies of the Member States, 
the committee of central bank governors would be given a more prominent role and all 
currencies would be included in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The second 
stage would be purely transitory, preparing for the third stage which would see the creation of 
a European System of Central Banks and the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates (Pedersen, 
1998: 127; Moravcsik, 1998: 443-444).  
 
Pooling: Extension of qualified majority voting 
Although the issue of qualified majority voting in certain policy areas was not one of the key 
issues of the IGC, discussions surrounding its extension (pooling) were subject to fierce 
divisions among the Member States. None of the governments supported an all-encompassing 
move to qualified majority voting and each insisted on a list of exceptions (see Corbett, 1992: 
55; Moravcsik, 1998: 454-455). Nevertheless, the Treaty of Maastricht extended qualified 
majority voting to some aspects of environmental policy, certain aspects of social policy and 
some of the new policy areas which were added to the EC Treaty such as incentive measures 
in the field of education and vocational training, health, development policy, consumer 
protection, and certain EMU measures. 
 
Delegation, pooling, the perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’ and institutional remedies 
As a result of selective delegation and pooling, we would expect political elites in the 
Member States – domestic political parties as well as their leaderships – to voice concerns 
about the consequences of the partially delegating and pooling of sovereignty for processes of 
democratic accountability and interest representation (proposition 1). Furthermore, we would 
expect governments and domestic political parties to take recourse to different ‘legitimating 
beliefs’ in expressing their preferences on the scope of the European Parliament’s 
involvement (proposition 2). 
 
In a resolution presented to Bundestag prior to the formal opening of the IGC, the 
Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee evaluated the state of the Community in the 
following way: “The realisation of the internal market and of the Economic and Monetary 
Union requires the transfer of additional national prerogatives to the European Community. 
This shall not occur without the simultaneous elimination of the democratic deficit in the 
Community’s institutional structure.” Consequently, the major political parties in the German 
Parliament demanded  that “[i]n the course of the development of the European Community 
towards a European Union, the democratic deficit shall be eliminated in particular by 
strengthening the European Parliament’s legislative and control powers.”
62 But even prior to 
the launching of an IGC on Political Union, a majority of Bundestag MPs were outspoken 
about the perceived necessity to enhance and extend the powers of the European Parliament in 
the light of an ever increasing transfer of sovereignty to the Community level. The resolutions 
tabled by government and opposition alike as well as the accompanying parliamentary 
debates mirror that essential elements of the Federal State ‘legitimating belief’ informed the 
actors’ preferences on how to tackle the ‘legitimacy deficit’: Since sovereignty can be shared, 
democratic legitimacy can be provided by parliamentary institutions at both the domestic and 
the ‘union’ level of government. Hence, the governing coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP) as well 
as the Social Democrats in opposition voiced that further transfers of sovereignty, such as the 
proposal to realise EMU, had to be accompanied by enhanced efforts to improve the 
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democratic legitimacy of Community policy-making.
63 During the parliamentary debate on 14 
March 1990 which dealt with the government’s as well as the Social Democrat’s proposals for 
a reform of the powers of the European Parliament, Bernd Rüttgers (MP, CDU) emphasised 
that to the degree that Community competencies were to be enhanced, “the ‘participatory 
deficit’ experienced by domestic parliaments will be exacerbated”,
64 thereby reaffirming the 
link between transfers of sovereignty and challenges to input legitimacy. During the same 
debate Uli Irmer (MP, FDP) underlined this observation. Although he welcomed the transfer 
of new competencies to the Community level, this transfer has to be made conditional upon 
empowering the European Parliament by endowing it with full legislative rights.
65  
 
From other corners of the Community, the link between transfers of sovereignty through 
pooling and delegation and the concomitant challenge to domestic channels of interest 
representation and democratic accountability was perceived no less virulently. In a 
memorandum, the Belgian government attests the Community a “growing ‘democratic 
shortfall’” if further transfers of sovereignty were not accompanied by increasing the 
European Parliament’s legislative powers (see Corbett, 1992: 121). The Dutch government 
was equally concerned about the lack of democratic ‘flanking’ mechanisms as the integration 
processes advanced. The government contends that a “transfer of powers to a supranational 
authority must therefore be accompanied by guarantees of sufficient democratic control at this 
level.” (Corbett, 1992: 127) Even those governments which, traditionally, were rather 
sceptical about the democratic legitimacy-leverage provided by a more resourceful European 
Parliament, did not dispute the prevailing logic that pooling and delegation of sovereignty 
could not ‘go alone’. The Danish government remarked in a memorandum which was 
approved by the Folketing’s Common Market Committee on 4 October 1990 that “[g]reater 
Community integration calls for a strengthening of the democratic process” and that 
consequently “the influence of both national parliaments and the European Parliament should 
be strengthened.” However, the proposed remedy to alleviate this legitimacy deficit was not to 
be found solely in strengthening the European Parliament. Rather, “a considerable part of 
what is known as the democratic shortfall is attributable to the fact that apparently not all 
national parliaments have an adequate say in the decisions taken at Community level. In this 
connection the Danish government would point to the role played by the Folketing’s Common 
Market Committee in Denmark.” (Corbett, 1992: 160) Although the Danish government 
emphasised an additional (if not an alternative) institutional mechanism to counter the 
Community’s ‘democratic shortfall’, it nevertheless accepted that a ‘natural’ link existed 
between the use of qualified majority voting in the Council (‘pooling’) and participation by 
the European Parliament in legislative decision-making (see Corbett, 1992: 160). However, 
the Danish memorandum already hinted at the disputed answer to the question as to what 
institutional remedies should be adopted to ease the Community’s ‘democratic shortfall’. 
Across the different Member States, alternative ‘legitimating beliefs’ determined responses 
and proposals on how interest representation and democratic accountability should be 
organised in a supranational polity. As in the Danish case, where the adequate response to 
remedy the ‘democratic shortfall’ was primarily seen in enhancing the scrutiny powers of its 
national parliament rather than by enhancing the legislative powers of the European 
Parliament, the British government was even more critical about the potential European 
Parliament’s contribution to alleviate the ‘legitimacy deficit’, yet with one exception: As long 
as the European Parliament directed its focus on scrutinising the Commission, the British 
government welcomed an enhanced role of the European Parliament since this would 
constitute another institutional check on the Commission and not undermine the power of the 
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Member States in the Council.
66 Consequently, any measures which, if exercised by the 
European Parliament, could affect the prerogatives of Member State governments or the 
Westminster Parliament would have to be impeded. The following exchange between Ted 
Rowlands (MP, Labour) and Douglas Hurd (Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs) illustrates that the British government, at the time, was not at all at 
ease with the consequences of actual or anticipated transfers of sovereignty in different policy 
areas for channels of domestic interest representation and democratic control: 
 
Ted Rowlands: “The Spaniards, French, Italians and even the Germans did not 
see sovereignty in terms of national parliamentary institutional powers and, in fact, 
there was great willingness to forsake a lot of national parliamentary power to bridge 
the European parliamentary deficit …” 
Douglas Hurd: “I think we do think more clearly and strongly in terms of 
national parliamentary sovereignty than probably any other Member States. The 
Danes, of course, have a sovereignty system which puts a big accent on it. The 
French accent the national sovereign government rather than a parliament – that is 
their historical accent. … I think that this is an area where we have an idiosyncratic 
position, but I think it is a just position. I do not think any House of Commons 
would let us stray too far away from it.”
67 
 
However, Hurd was prepared to tolerate changes to the EP’s non-legislative roles, such as 
enhancing its scrutiny powers vis-à-vis the Commission “making it the watchdog of the 
Community’s finances.” (Forster, 1999: 138) However, he made equally clear that “[t]his … 
was not a genuine attempt to strengthen the EP, because the government did not want the EP 
to adopt wholesale the Westminster parliamentary model of executive scrutiny and 
accountability.” (Forster, 1999: 139) Yet, compared to the debates prior to the SEA, Prime 
Minister Thatcher public expressions about the role of the European Parliament seemed much 
more ‘accommodating’ of the very sceptical views of the majority of Conservative MPs. 
Forster argues that “[e]nhancing the powers of the EP was seen by both parliamentarians and 
the government as a threat to British sovereignty and a challenge to Westminster, and 
ministers were acutely aware that backbenchers ‘had a juicy bone in their mind’s eye’ when 
they though of EP ambitions.” (Forster, 1999: 138) During the IGC John Major, who 
succeeded Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in November of 1990, considered proposals 
for the European Parliament’s involvement rather unproblematic as long as they did not affect 
a reduction in decision-making efficiency and as long as they provided for a closer check on 
the supranational Commission. Yet, it was considered unacceptable if changes in treaty were 
to impact on the distribution of powers among the Community institutions to detriment of 
national governments. The British position on the question of the European Parliament’s 
powers was thus contains elements of both, the Economic Community and Intergovernmental 
Cooperation ‘legitimating belief’, whereas the party leadership and members of government 
were less doctrinal than a considerable portion of the parliamentary party which firmly 
adhered to the Intergovernmental Cooperation ‘legitimating belief’. 
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The above evidence suggests that the extension of qualified majority voting prompted most 
national governments and domestic political parties to activate the link between pooling and 
enhancing the European Parliament’s legislative role in areas subject to qualified majority 
vote. However, a much less direct link existed between the delegation of sovereignty in the 
monetary policy-area and institutional mechanisms to remedy any potential challenges this 
might pose to input legitimacy. Why was this the case? The creation of a single currency and 
the concomitant installation of an independent central bank were prompted by a ‘normative 
consensus’ which solidified across the vast majority of Community governments during the 
1980s (see Moravcsik, 1998; McNamara, 2002). The creation of the European Central Bank 
thus reflected a shared belief system which “elevated the pursuit of low inflation over growth 
and employment goals and replaced the Keynesian policy ideas of political elites …” 
(McNamara, 2002: 164) One of the corollaries of the “monetarist-influenced consensus” was 
the “commitment to government non-intervention” in order not to jeopardise the primary goal 
of low inflation (McNamara, 2002: 164).
68 Consequently, international cooperation in 
monetary policy implied a virtually non-disputed imperative for institutional design: the 
creation of an independent central bank shielded from political intervention. From this 
perspective, cooperation in monetary policy ‘had’ to be ‘undemocratic’ from the purview of 
input legitimacy although the European Central Bank is required to present its annual report 
to the European Parliament and must respond to questions. However, the European 
Parliament is prohibited from influencing the European Central Bank (see McNamara, 2002: 
167). In the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the German 
government was most adamant that the European Central Bank would remain independent 
and be granted a strong anti-inflationary mandate. Moreover, “Germany resisted French, 
Italian, and Commission demands for the inclusion of macroeconomic priorities other than 
inflation (e.g., unemployment, growth targets) in the ECB mandate …” (Moravcsik, 1998: 
444) Furthermore, only Belgium and the Netherlands displayed support for giving the 
Commission, Court, or the European Parliament a role in monetary policy-making (see 
Moravcsik, 1998: 444). 
 
The transfer of monetary policy competencies to the Community-level, however, sparked 
concerns among national governments and political parties that, despite the deliberate creation 
of non majoritarian-mechanisms in the field of monetary policy, majoritarian elements had to 
be enforced elsewhere since, as George Ross puts it correctly, “there were few openings to 
include the European Parliament in the workings of EMU.” (Ross, 1995: 187) Especially the 
German government, which had domestically committed to support the empowering of the 
European Parliament, considered that “a trade-off on democracy would have to lie elsewhere 
than in EMU … The European Parliament was given a token role in appointing the president 
of the European Central Bank and the right to receive periodic reports, but little more.” (Ross, 
1995: 187, emphasis added) Some of the national governments, Germany and the Netherlands 
in particular, as well as the Commission actively lobbied for more competencies for the 
                                                 
68 In the theoretical literature, the rationale for non-intervention of elected politicians in certain policy areas is 
grounded in the so called time inconsistency problem which arises when a government’s optimal long-term 
policy differs from what it would like to do in the short-term, in order win elections or please and appease 
powerful constituents. In monetary policy, the time inconsistency problem thus arises when politicians expect 
short-term gains from expansionary policies, for example, to reduce unemployment and for the sake of winning 
re-election. Yet, they know – at the same time – that better macroeconomic results would ensue in the long-run if 
they ‘tied themselves to the mast’ even though they would not always feel very good about it in the short run. 
Consequently, societies who wish to deal with the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy legislate a 
long-term goal for the central bank (such as price stability) and delegate operational independence and discretion 
to central bankers who have longer time horizons and an aversion to inflation in contrast to rather short-term 
oriented, elected officials (see, for example, Blinder, 1998).   28
European Parliament in the context of the negotiations on Political Union, above all by 
strengthening its role in the legislative process, giving it the right to legislative co-decision, 
during talks on Political Union in exchange for EMU. However, even though challenges to 
input legitimacy were also perceived by the other national governments, there was no 
agreement on the institutional solutions for its remedy: As mentioned above, the Danish und 
British governments were reluctant to grant the European Parliament more influence since it 
was the national parliaments which should be more closely connected to Community-relevant 
decision-making. Furthermore, the French government – although not united internally on the 
EP-question – remained sceptical about the role of the European Parliament in compensating 
for the input legitimacy that was ‘lost’ domestically. Prime Minister John Major reports in his 
memoirs that President Mitterrand was against any proposal that allowed the European 
Parliament to veto decisions of ‘sovereign governments’: “His view, expressed to me 
privately, was that the European Parliament ‘has no legitimacy and will not have for a 
hundred years’. He was not to say this publicly …” (Major, 2000: 270, emphasis added; see 
also Védrine, 1996: 460)  
 
7. Summary of Findings 
On the basis of the empirical evidence presented in the preceding sections, propositions 1 and 
2 can be corroborated since in all the cases under scrutiny, national governments pooled or 
delegated sovereignty which exacerbated concerns about a possible asymmetry between 
output and input legitimacy among political elites in the Community Member States (see 
Table 2). Furthermore, strengthening the Community’s majoritarian organ, the European 
Parliament, was not considered to be the only avenue to improve the Community’s 
democratic credentials. Different national governments advanced different proposals as to 
how the perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’ should be tackled, inspired by different ‘legitimating 
beliefs’ (as predicted in proposition 2). Table 3 summarises the ‘legitimating beliefs’ 
advanced by the respective governments prior and during the negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the respective treaty documents in the cases discussed in this section. 
 
Table 2: Summary of findings – proposition 1 
 
  ECSC 




















(Who controls the 
‘executive’?) 
+ 
(Who compensates for 
the decline of the 
budgetary role of 
national parliaments?) 
+ 
(Who holds national 
executives to account 
when they are outvoted?) 
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ECSC  Treaty of Luxembourg SEA / Maastricht 
Federal State  Germany, France 
ÆSupport for EP with 
‘real’ powers 
‘The Five’ 
ÆSupport for EP with 
budgetary powers 
Germany, Italy, 
Benelux etc. ÆSupport 






ÆHostile towards EP 
with budgetary powers 
UK (Tory 
backbenchers) 
ÆHostile towards EP 










8. Conclusion and Implications 
Looking beyond the European Union, the expectations derived from the propositions 
presented in this paper, the first one in particular, should be equally applicable to other 
systems of (international) political order. One of the intentions of this paper was to 
demonstrate that the forces driving the European Union’s constitutional development cannot 
be solely captured by assuming that the political elites who created and reform the 
Community’s institution did and continue to do so for purely instrumental reasons, whether 
they are seeking to lock in policy goals, realise power/status-related preferences or improve 
the collective problem-solving capacity. In this conclusion, I will briefly recap the key 
arguments presented in the paper and point to its implications for the question about the 
sources of pressure for increasing the input legitimacy of governance institutions of 
international polities. 
 
The ‘conceptual turn’: The ‘democratic deficit’ as a value of the independent variable 
It was hypothesised that when democratic states pool and/or delegate sovereignty (for purely 
instrumental reasons!) they are nevertheless likely to be sensitive to the challenges of 
sovereignty transfers to the input  legitimacy of their respective domestic polities. 
Consequently, certain aspects of the Community polity, and foremost its majoritarian 
element, i.e. the creation and ongoing empowerment of the European Parliament, can only be 
understood when we explore the link between sovereignty transfers and the perceived 
repercussions that shifts in sovereignty effectuate on domestic mechanisms of democratic 
representation and accountability. From this perspective, the argument that the ‘democratic 
deficit’ is of ‘post-SEA’ origin and has only started to ‘haunt’ the Community polity since the 
1990s seems flawed and deceptive: In my own work, I have shown that political elites’ 
perception of the existence of a ‘democratic deficit’, in anticipation of decisions to delegate 
powers to supranational agents, and to pool budgetary and legislative powers, has triggered 
calls for a ‘democratisation’ of Community-level procedures and institutions, albeit to varying 
degrees (see B. Rittberger, 2001, 2003). Hence, given the observation that we can ascribe 
institutional design implications to the ‘democratic deficit’ as perceived by political elites 
when pooling and delegation looms, it seems ever more surprising that the ample literature on 
the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ has not conceptualised the ‘democratic deficit’ as a value of an 
independent variable! Instead, scores of scholars have engaged in exactly the opposite; by 
conceptualising the ‘democratic deficit’ as a value of the dependent variable, there is a flood   30
of literature which assesses the credentials of democracy in the EU against a set of 
benchmarks or conditions derived from normative or empirical democratic theory. Implicitly 
or explicitly, most of the scholarship employs, as a starting point, the three conditions for 
democratic legitimacy which Abraham Lincoln famously espoused in his Gettysburg address 




¾  ‘Government of the people’ or social legitimacy refers to the condition that legitimacy 
can only be granted within distinct geographical boundaries which, in the era of the 
nation state, are commonly defined by a certain degree of social homogeneity and a 
collective identity among the citizens (see, for example, Höreth, 1999). 
¾  ‘Government by the people’ or input legitimacy refers to the condition that “[p]olitical 
choices … reflect the ‘will of the people’ – that is, if they can be derived from the 
authentic preferences of the members of a community.” (Scharpf, 1999: 6). 
¾  ‘Government for the people or output legitimacy refers to the condition that “political 
choices … effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question.” 
(Scharpf, 1999: 6) 
 
The bulk of the literature on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ has taken these conditions as 
benchmarks to evaluate whether or not the EU polity can be qualified as a polity that carries 
the capacity to command democratic legitimacy across these different dimensions. Yet, 
whereas some contributions to the literature on the ‘democratic deficit’ focus on only one 
legitimacy-dimension other contributions to the debate provide a multi-dimensional 
assessment of the EU’s democratic legitimacy-credentials. Table 4 is a non-exhaustive 
overview of the ‘democratic deficit’-literature. It illustrates that the questions of whether or 
not the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’ and whether or not this deficit can be remedied 
(at all) depends on the standards scholars adopt for their definition of legitimate democratic 
governance. Alternative normative or empirical democratic theories provide a variety of 
possible benchmarks to assess the democratic legitimacy of a polity. It comes as little surprise 
that not only the assessment as to the existence and severity of a ‘democratic deficit’ vary 
enormously across (and even within) the different dimensions, but also that the prospects for 
its remedy display enormous variation. 
                                                 
69 See <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/4403.html>,  accessed 5 February 2003, emphasis added.   31
 




Standards / conditions for 
democratically legitimate 
governance in the EU 
Is there a  ‘democratic deficit’? 
How can it be remedied? 
Input legitimacy 
(‘Government by the people’) 
¾ Real ‘European’ elections and 
cohesive, competitive parties (Hix, 
1998) 
¾Application of established scales 
of democracy (civil liberties, 
political rights, democratic rule) 
(Zweifel, 2003) 
¾ Yes: institutional design and 
reform (short/medium term 
solution) 
¾ No (or: not greater than in most 
liberal democracies) 
Output legitimacy 
(‘Government for the people’) 
¾ Regulatory credibility through 
non majoritarian institutions 
(Majone, 1996a, 1996b, 2000) 
¾ No (but: parliamentarisation of 
Commission threatens regulatory 
credibility) (Majone 2000) 
Social legitimacy 
(‘Government of the people’) 
¾Community of memory, 
experience, and of communication 
(Kielmansegg, 1996) 
¾ Yes (low ‘democratic capacity’): 
identity-building (long term 
solution) 
Hybrid category (combination of 
different legitimacy dimensions) 
¾ Congruence between rulers and 
ruled, collective identity, 
reversibility (of substantive 
decisions), de-selection (of office 
holders) (Zürn, 1996) 
¾ Democratic self-determination 
(input legitimacy) and effective 
self-determination through social 
and welfare policy provisions 
(output legitimacy) (Scharpf, 1999, 
2001) 
¾ Constitutional checks and 
constraints on exercising power, 
accountability of ‘technocratic’ 
governance, participation 
(Moravcsik, 2002) 
¾ Yes: institutional design, identity-




¾ Yes: identity-building measures 
to legitimise EU-wide redistributive 







But irrespective of the choice of benchmark or standard for democratically legitimate 
governance in the EU, the ‘democratic deficit’-literature has, so far, suffered from one serious 
shortcoming: By conceptualising the ‘democratic deficit’ as a part of the dependent variable, 
namely as a phenomenon that has to be assessed, evaluated or explained by taking recourse to 
benchmarks of democratically legitimate governance derived from normative and empirical 
democratic theory, the literature has proven to be conceptually blind to the question about the 
conditions under which we would expect political elites to perceive and act upon a 
‘democratic deficit’! I have shown in this paper that by conceptualising the ‘democratic 
deficit’ as a value of the independent variable, it is possible to ‘test’ some of the implicit 
claims made by the myriad of pieces on the ‘democratic deficit’. If it matters to political 
elites, we should be able to observe that it has at least some implications on the way political 
elites design and reform EU institutions.  
 
The ‘democratic deficit’ and international polities 
Notwithstanding the more recent debates about global (democratic) and cosmopolitan 
governance, it is noteworthy that discussions and discourse about the ‘democratic deficit’ 
have centred most prominently on the EU. Nevertheless, Eric Stein (2001) shows that a 
correlation exists between the level of integration of an international organisation (a measure 
which includes, inter alia, the degree to which sovereignty is pooled and delegated) and the   32
public discourse (mirrored in statements by academics, practitioners, authoritative 
spokespersons etc.) about the “democratic-legitimacy deficit” (Stein, 2001: 489) of the 
functioning and structure of the international organisation. Stein finds that “[i]n an 
organization where the rule of consensus prevails”, i.e. an organisation with an 
intergovernmental decision-making mode, “and [where] the area of activity is essentially 
technical and relies on “independent” experts, the [‘democratic deficit’-]discourse does not 
arise or is muted. … At the point, however, where the member states become subject to 
majority vote and the organization’s competence is broad enough to require the settings of 
priorities and mediation between conflicting interests and values, the level of discourse in 
democratic societies rises, and becomes linked to a more general debate on reforming the 
organization.” (Stein, 2001: 530) Comparing four different international organisations, Stein 
finds that the EU has the highest level of integration and displays the highest level of 
discourse about the ‘democratic deficit’. With regard to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), where delegation of certain judicial functions has occurred, Stein shows that “the 
discourse originated in the use of the adjudicatory power of the institution.” (Stein, 2001: 530) 
In contrast, international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), an 
essentially “technical” agency (Stein, 2001: 496), or regional economic groupings such as 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) remain essentially state-based 
organisations with comparatively low levels of integration and consequently, the ‘democratic’ 
or ‘legitimacy deficit’-discourse does not arise. Stein’s findings not only strongly correlate 
with the arguments advanced in this paper and empirical evidence presented elsewhere (B. 
Rittberger, 2003), his findings also amply back one of the main propositions advanced in this 
paper: Where political elites pool and delegate sovereignty, it is likely that these political 
elites perceive a ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’. 
 
One goal of this paper was advance causal arguments and testable propositions which can 
help us explain why, as of yet, the institutional settings of other international organisations do 
not contain strong representative or majoritarian elements. While other institutionalised forms 
of inter-state cooperation are some distance away of pooling or delegating major portions of 
their sovereignty, recent calls by globalisation critics, the media, academics and politicians to 
alleviate the ‘democratic deficits’ inherent in the functioning and the trajectory of the actions 
of the WTO and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) may, in the future, pave the way for further regional or 
even global majoritarian institutions (epitomised by a ‘global parliament’ suggested by Falk 
and Strauss, 2001, 2002) to legitimise international governance in a world in which the 
production and distribution of benefits from socio-economic and security cooperation 
transcends the capacity of individual nation states (see, for example, V. Rittberger, 2000). 
Yet, the vision of a “global parliament” is written off by Joseph Nye as presently unattainable 
owing to the absence of a “sufficiently strong sense of community” which renders the 
extension of domestic and democratic voting procedures to the global level not necessarily 
practical nor acceptable to minorities (Nye, 2002).
70 Fritz Scharpf underlines this argument 
arguing that majoritarian decision-making institutions on a global scale have its limits, in 
particular in redistributive policy areas where inter- or supranational solutions (though they 
may be more effective than unilateral ones) do not (yet) command public acceptance. This is 
                                                 
70 According to Keohane and Nye, the creation of a ‘global parliament’ reflects a cosmopolitan view of 
democracy which departs from the assumption that the globe is one big constituency. This, however, “implies 
the existence of a political community in which citizens of 198 states would be willing to be continually 
outvoted by a billion Chinese and a billion Indians. … Most meaningful voting, and associated democratic 
political activities, occurs within the boundaries of nation-states that have democratic constitutions and 
processes. Minorities are willing to acquiesce to a majority in which they may not participate directly because 
they feel they participate in some larger community.” (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 33)   33
because the European Union (and also any other international organisation) is “very far from 
having achieved the ‘thick’ collective identity that we have come to take for granted in 
national democracies …”  (Scharpf, 1999: 9), and only where the “belief in a ‘thick’ 
collective identity can be taken for granted, majority rule may indeed lose its threatening 
character, and it can also be relied upon to legitimize measures of interpersonal and 
interregional redistribution that would not be otherwise acceptable” (Scharpf, 1999: 8-9). 
While thus ‘economic man’, or the bourgeois, thinks and acts in categories beyond the nation-
state, benefiting from the opportunities offered by international cooperation, ‘social man’, or 
the citoyen, continues to be caged in national categories, norms and identities which partially 
constrain the delegation of sovereignty from the domain of domestic polities to the inter- or 
supranational level (see Zürn, 1996: 34). While this may be true for certain policy areas, it 
does not preclude that political elites continue to pool and delegate parts of their sovereignty 
in policy areas where the ‘thick’ collective identity-requirement is less constraining, such as 
in  distributive  and  regulatory  policy areas (see, for example, Majone, 1996; von Beyme, 
1998; Scharpf, 1999). Even if we accept that pooling and delegation is most likely to occur in 
certain designated policy areas of regulatory and distributive politics, and if we accept that 
this is most likely to occur in a regional rather than a global context, the arguments advanced 
in this paper still stand firm. Wherever democratically organised states pool and delegate 
sovereignty, questions of democratic accountability and representation are likely to loom 
large, and consequently, calls to alleviate the asymmetry between output and input legitimacy 
are likely to be mirrored in demands for majoritarian institutions at the supranational level. 
 
Although this paper’s dominant focus was on the EU and the debate surrounding its 
‘democratic deficit’, this paper has equally suggested that the causal relationships stipulated 
by the different propositions are not at all restricted to the study of the EU. Why is it, for 
example, that the European Parliament – with its supervisory, budgetary and legislative 
powers, today, is the most influential parliamentary assembly in the universe of international 
organisations? Why do the parliamentary assemblies of, for instance, the Council of Europe or 
of the Western European Union merely fulfil a consultative function and lack budgetary, 
legislative and supervisory powers? These differences in the strength of parliamentary 
assemblies in international organisations thus supply important variation that needs to be 
explained. To account for this variation, we have to specify conditions under which we expect 
national governments to opt for the creation and empower of parliamentary assemblies in 
international organisations. This paper has provided one route to explain this variation: The 
decision of national governments to transfer portions of their sovereignty through pooling 
(e.g. by introducing majority voting procedures among Member State ‘principals’) and 
delegation (e.g., by transferring decision-making powers to independent ‘agents’) triggers a 
situation in which ‘principles’ (in democratic polities) are likely to perceive a ‘democratic 
legitimacy deficit’. This ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’ is characterised by an asymmetry 
between the enhanced problem-solving capacity of the international polity as a result of 
pooling and delegation (whereby the output legitimacy of the polity is enhanced) and 
domestic procedures for interest representation, interest mediation and democratic 
accountability (whereby the input legitimacy of the polity is reduced). The causal relationship 
between transfers of sovereignty, the perceived ‘democratic legitimacy deficit’ and proposals 
to enhance the procedural legitimacy of decision-making process is captured by the following 
proposition: Political elites are likely to perceive a democratic ‘legitimacy deficit’ when they 
engage in the pooling and delegation of sovereignty to manage socio-economic and security 
interdependencies. This perceived ‘legitimacy deficit’ is the driving force behind attempts of 
political elites to democratise the institutional set-up of and decision-making procedures 
within international polities. 
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